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 1.  Introduction  
 In recent years, a reform of the supervision authorities has been under discussion in every 
European country. The basic issue is whether it is appropriate for the central bank, already in charge 
of monetary policy1, to be made responsible for supervision2 as well. In some countries banking 
regulation is carried out by the central bank, in others it is the duty of different authorities, possibly 
in collaboration with the central bank, or lastly it is the task of a single authority separate from the 
central bank.  Among the European countries, the latter is true of the United Kingdom3, Austria4, 
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Sweden5, Hungary6, Malta, Estonia and Latvia. On a world level,  of 
Japan and South Korea.  Ireland on the other hand is an anomaly. The only authority responsible for 
bank supervision there is the central bank7. What is therefore emerging are two models: one with a 
single authority and the other with multiple authorities8.  
                                                 
1 On the factors determining the decision to delegate responsibility for monetary policy to the central bank, a valid 
answer is given by Alesina - Tabellini (2003). 
2 According to Lannoo(1999), the rethinking of the job of banking supervision can be explained with the growing 
development of banks and the loss of clarity about the services offered. 
3 The FSA in the United Kingdom placed banking supervision outside the central bank, but since one of the functions of 
regulation is to protect from systemic risk, a close, transparent relationship needs to be established with the central bank 
and the Ministry of Finance.  In 1997 a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the FSA, the Treasury, and 
the Bank of England. This Memorandum explains how the three bodies work together to achieve financial stability. But 
“The Authorities of the United Kingdom underline that models of regulation should reflect the structural and cultural 
characteristics of local financial services market. What is right for the United Kingdom, is not necessarily right for 
all”. Sykes (FSA 2004)  
4 Austria adopted the FMA single authority supervision model in 2002. This body carries out supervision on the 
banking, insurance, pension fund, and stock market, cooperating with the Austrian central bank. 
Grunbichler – Darlap (FMA 2004)  
5 In Sweden the central bank (Riksbank) answers directly to Parliament and has no supervisory role. Its role is to 
promote a safe and efficient payment system and lender of last resort. Since 1971 supervision has been entrusted to a 
single authority (Finansinspektionen) which watches over the banking, stock and insurance markets with the purpose of 
achieving stability and efficiency in the financial system and defending the consumer.   
Strom (FSA 2004)  
6 In Hungary the single financial authority was set up in April 2000, with responsibility for the whole financial sector. 
Decisions taken by the supervising body are final. Appeals can only be made through the courts of justice. Even before 
the institution of the single authority, the Hungarian central bank never had a banking supervision role. 
Balogh (FSA 2004)  
7 Holland is moving in the same direction. 
Assigning the role of prudential supervision to the central bank involves advantages and disadvantages. Among the 
pros, we find systemic stability, stability in the system of payments, cost efficiency, good central bank reputation, which 
can however become a disadvantage if the reputation is bad. There may be other disadvantages in terms of price 
stability, monetary policy dictated by the banks, over-concentration of power in the hands of the central bank. 
Prast –  Lelyveld (De Nederlandsche Bank 2004)   
8 In a recent work Masciandaro (2005) uses an empirical model to analyse the possible factors determining the process 
of reunification in the various European countries. 
For an examination of the pros and cons of attributing the responsibility for monetary policy and supervision to the 
central bank, cfr. Peek – Rosengren – Tootell (1999, 2001, 2003); Masciandaro (1993), Eijffinger (2001) and for further 
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The policymaker, whose main aim is to be re-elected, is the one who decides the institutional 
setup9.  The political economy choices will be, therefore, influenced by the wish to get the favour of 
the electors. Theoretical analysis10 suggests that the politician prefers an expansive monetary policy 
before the elections and a tight monetary policy, to low inflation, in the post electoral period. The 
possibility for the government to handle monetary policy depends on institutional design, chosen in 
every country. Independent central banks or dependent central banks with more conservative central 
banker limit the possibility for the policymaker to carry out twisted political economics11. Such 
setup is not therefore desirable for a politician in the pre-electoral period, especially in that 
countries characterized by an higher rate of unemployment. The hypothesis is correct if there is 
agreement, inside the same political class, on the monetary policy choices12. How is it possible now 
to connect the different politician’s setup choice, according to the period he is in, with the 
possibility that the responsibility of  supervision policy is entrusted to central banker by the same 
policymaker? In fact the possibility that the central banker is able or less to have the assignment to 
pursue the financial stability complicates the picture. From the point of view of the policymaker, the 
conduct of supervision policy, has some implications in terms of cost-benefits analysis. We can 
think that in general the politician prefers, especially in electoral period, attitudes of financial 
accommodation from the supervisor. He should carry out a policy to avoid bankruptcies, because it 
is politically more advantageous (you think about the diffused benefits for depositors and to the 
specific advantages for banking and bankers). This, however, does not mean that it is always 
politically convenient that the central bank has the powers both of monetary policy and of 
supervision. In fact, if the central banker is inclinable to an accommodating monetary policy, to 
                                                                                                                                                                  
depth Padoa – Schioppa  (1999), among those in favour. Arguments in favour of separation are reported in Goodhart - 
Shoenmarker (1995); Eijffinger – De Haan (1996); Di Noia – Di Giorgio (1999).   
9 The first studies on the electoral cycle are those of  Nordhaus (1975), Hibbs (1977), then they were taken back by 
Alesina (1987), Alesina - Sachs (1988).   
10 See Kydland - Prescott(1977) and Barro - Gordon (1983a,b) for models on the economic political cycle with rational 
expectations (time inconsistency). 
11 There are a lot of theoretical studies and empirical analysis in literature on the relationship between different degrees 
of central bank independence and inflation’s performance and other macroeconomics variables. For the first one see 
Rogoff (1985), Lohmann (1992), Walsh (1995), Persson - Tabellini (1997). For the second one see: Bade- Parkin 
(1985), Alesina (1989), Grilli - Masciandaro- Tabellini (1991), Cukierman (1992), Alesina - Summers (1993). 
12 Eijffinger - Hoeberichts (1996), Bernhard (1998). 
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possess the powers of supervision would mean to be able to develop easier a laxist monetary policy; 
and this serves the interest of the politician. Otherwise, if the central banker is conservative, he 
would pay attention to his not accommodating reputation. In this case, he would like to strengthen  
such reputation, with the same behaviour, also when he carries out the supervision policy.  
The present paper intends to analyze theoretically this problem list13.            
The paper is structured as follows: after the introduction, in the second section we present the 
general model. In the third and fourth sections we examine the principal-and-two-agents model in 
the electoral and non-electoral periods.  In the fifth  and seventh sections the single-agent contract is 
analysed, in the electoral and non-electoral periods.  The sixth and eighth sections give a 
comparison between the two contracts. In the ninth section remarks and possible developments are 
discussed.  Finally, our conclusions. 
 
2. The general model   
This paper14 analyses the advantage to be gained in entrusting the tasks of “banking supervision” 
and “monetary policy” to two agents, Banking Authority (BA) and Central Bank (CB), or to a 
single agent, CB. In this analysis two periods are examined: electoral and non-electoral. The model 
is that of a principal with two agents, where the principal is the political group in power, while the 
agents are, as we have said, BA and CB. 
The politician has his own utility function U, which will take on four different values according to 
whether four different events take place. These events are: 
  Bs = stability in the banking system 
  Ps =  price stability 
–Bs = banking instability 
–Ps = price instability. 
The utility function U is defined thus: 
                                                 
13In the literature there are no theoretical models linking the problem of the choice of institutional setup of supervisory 
bodies, with the electoral cycle.     
14 The approach adopted is that proposed by Franck - Krausz (2004) 
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